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BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND THE NATIONAL
OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM
JAMES A. CRUTCHFIELDt ROBERT W. KATESt
AND W. R. DERRICK SEWELL §

In 1964 the National Academy of Sciences-National Research
Council published a monograph entitled Economic Benefits from
Oceanographic Research.' The study was issued with considerable
fanfare, and it has attracted wide attention among scholars in the
diverse fields associated with oceanography and in both the popular
and professional press. It is not surprising that it should-the list
of authors includes some of the most distinguished names in the
field of oceanography. The field itself has been the object of intense
interest in both executive and congressional branches of the Government-so much so, that the governmental research effort in the field
has been designated as a National Oceanographic Program. Research expenditures on oceanographic research supported by the
federal government are growing rapidly. In 1954 the expenditures
were 24 million dollars and projections of the Interagency Committee on Oceanography indicate they will increase to 350 million
dollars by 1972.
While the authors of the monograph are to be commended for
a courageous attempt to develop an objective basis for appraisal of
government research in a most difficult area, the results must be
termed disappointing. The disappointing results may be attributed to
the inevitable "softness" of data and data sources in any field in which
the distance between basic scientific research and commercially usable
end products is as great as in oceanography. In part it reflects the
unavailability of a common yardstick to measure the value of commercially usable outputs and of those outputs that may ultimately
prove of incalculable benefit in a material sense, but which for the
moment simply represent additions to knowledge. But the study also
suffers from errors in concept and fact to a degree not warranted by
the present state of knowledge.
t Professor of Economics, University of Washington, Seattle.

I Associate Professor of Geography, Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts.
§ Assistant Professor of Geography, University of Victoria, Canada.
1. National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council (Pub. No. 1228, 1964).
The authors are indebted to Dr. M. B. Shaefer for helpful interpretations of the NAS
study and for pointing out several numerical errors in the original draft of this paper.
His assistance does not, however, indicate agreement with the conclusions.
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The difficulties of softness of data and data sources and lack of
a common yardstick reflect inherent constraints on the accuracy of
numerical results; the authors' treatment can be disputed only on
the basis of specific assumptions as to the reliability of particular
sets of data. The latter weakness is less excusable, since the internal
logic of benefit-cost analysis and the essential requirements of its
proper application have been thoroughly explored in the literature:
first in the field of water resources, 2 and more recently, in relation
to a wider range of government investment programs.'
The application of benefit-cost analysis to oceanographic research
is both legitimate and illuminating. In many respects, it illustrates
the most difficult types of appraisal problems in the field of public
investment. There are tremendous gaps in man's knowledge of
physical parameters and in his ability to relate physical to economic
magnitudes. The investment required to carry on productive research and development in the ocean environment is extremely
heavy and the pay-off period is both long and subject to a high
degree of uncertainty. Most oceanographic research therefore, is
"Big Science. ' 4 In addition, a relatively high proportion of the
research must be considered basic rather than applied at the present
level of understanding. Both facts suggest that massive government
participation and financial support is required if the job is to be
done adequately. Clearly, one cannot rely on the market mechanism
to provide sufficient stimulus to private industry or the university
community to do the necessary level or type of research and development work. But oceanography is only one claimant seeking
recognition at the public till, and some method of establishing priorities within the field itself, and of justifying specific levels of research effort, must be developed.
In this Article two weaknesses of the National Academy of Science (NAS) study will be discussed: (1) conceptual errors, and
(2) questions of fact and figure. There is every reason to extend
the application of a technique for evaluating choices that has proved
so useful in other areas, particularly if oceanography is to justify
the intensified attention of professionals in the field and the expanded activity demanded by the general public and financed by the
2. For an excellent summary of literature on the application of benefit-cost analysis
to water resources projects, see Lee, Local Government Public Works Decision Making,
chs. 3, 4 (Institute in Engineering-Economics Systems Report No. EEP-9, 1964).
3. See, e.g., Dorfman (ed.), Measuring Benefits of Government Investments (1965).
4. The concept of "Big Science" is described in Weinberg, Criterion for Scientific
Choice, Physics Today 42 (March 1964).
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federal government. If benefit-cost analysis is to be applied to oceanographic research and its fruits, however, its application should be
done properly and with full attention to both its potential and its
limitations. To the extent that the NAS study falls short of these
requirements, it could do more harm than good, not only to a program
that deserves greater support, but also to the broader use of benefitcost analysis as a tool of economic evaluation.
The NAS panel attempted to identify and estimate the economic
value of benefits stemming from oceanographic research after a tenyear period of expenditures, and to compare these estimates with
the cost of the research. The benefits consist of increases in physical
production of food and minerals from the ocean and cost savings
from improvements in sea transportation, long-range weather forecasting, near-shore sewage disposal, and near-shore recreation. Both
costs and benefits are discounted at ten per cent to the time at which
research costs are actually incurred and, alternatively, to present
values.
The NAS authors indicate three purposes: (1) to measure the
contribution of the oceanographic program to the well-being of the
United States; (2) to provide a very rough basis for comparison
of returns from this program with those that might be obtained
from alternative uses of the funds to be expended; and (3) to
suggest a conceptual and computational framework that could be
employed by others who might make quite different judgments
about the numerical values used.
The NAS authors state that their estimates are based only on
"tangible and foreseeable economic results of federally supported
oceanographic research." 5 No attempt has been made to forecast
breakthroughs or to place dollar values on national defense or on
the human satisfaction derived from greater understanding of the
oceans and of life in the sea. No estimates of economic values for
5. National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Economic Benefits
From Oceanographic Research 2 (Pub. No. 1228, 1964). The NAS panel estimated that
a total expenditure of 1.389 billion dollars on oceanographic research over the next ten
years would result in total economic benefits of over 6 billion dollars, both values being
discounted to the present. These benefits would be derived from increased United
States and foreign fisheries production, amounting to 2.418 billion dollars; increased
mineral production, worth 336 million dollars; and reductions in shipping costs amounting to 958 million dollars. The panel estimated that the projected expenditures on
oceanographic research would also result in improvements in long-range weather forecasting worth 1.354 billion dollars, reductions in near-shore sewage disposal costs
worth 321 million dollars, and improvements in near-shore recreational opportunities
worth 677 million dollars.
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several potentially useful "outputs" of oceanographic research have
been included where the necessary research is normally carried out
by private firms or where even rough data are lacking.
I
ELEMENTS OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS

A full review of the principles of benefit-cost analysis is beyond
the scope of this Article.6 However, a brief restatement of a few
key concepts is essential. Basically, benefit-cost analysis represents
a simulation of the operation of a competitive market economy to
provide a basis for allocation of resources in sectors where for any
of several reasons, the market mechanism will not function properly. In some instances the private sector will not undertake investments that would clearly yield benefits greater than costs because no
effective way can be devised to charge for the former. In other
situations, economies of scale may be available only to a public
agency, or for technical reasons only one or a few operating units can
be permitted. In still others, the basic "rule of the game" in private
enterprise that all costs be borne by those who inflict them on society
may be violated. For example, in water pollution, downstream costs
are difficult to identify and quantify, and costs are even more difficult
to levy on those who cause them. Finally, many benefits from social
investments, including research and development, simply cannot be
measured in economic terms. Among others, the accumulation of
knowledge for its own sake, an essential element in man's restless
striving for fulfillment, defies quantification in monetary terms, yet
it can hardly be ignored as an output of many types of government,
academic, and industrial research.
Benefit-cost analysis represents a technique for choosing among
alternative uses of resources for varying objectives. The maximization of net national product (the money value of the net output
of goods and services in the economy as a whole) is the most common of the objectives sought. It rests upon two essential comparisons: (1) a comparison of present with future benefits, via
discounting of more distant benefits to present values; and (2) a
comparison of benefits with costs, the latter representing the value
of goods and services that could have been produced with the resources to be devoted to the use in question. Assuming proper meas6. This has been set forth in detail in Sewell,
(1961).

Guide to Benefit-Cost

Analysis
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urement, an efficient program requires: (1) that the program as a
whole show a ratio of benefits to costs greater than unity; (2) that
each separable part of the program show benefits in excess of costs;
and (3) that the scale of the program be such that marginal
net social benefits are zero, that is, benefits less total costs are
7
maximized.
II
CONCEPTUAL WEAKNESSES IN THE NAS REPORT

A. Gross and Net Benefits
There is much evidence that the authors of the NAS study,
though well-acquainted with the words of benefit-cost, were much
less familiar with the music. The result is a series of conceptual
errors that severely damage the usefulness of the entire exercise. A
basic and elementary principle is that benefits are computed in net
terms; that is, the addition to market value resulting from the additional output of goods and services minus the costs of associated
factors of production required to produce it. In several placesnotably in the valuation of outdoor recreation, mining, and commercial fishing-the authors of the NAS study appear to have
computed benefits in gross terms; or to have made grossly inadequate estimates of the associated costs of using resources in the
ways indicated if the percentages of benefits not allocated to oceanographic research in Column I of Table I are of the NAS report
presumed to include associated factor costs. (Dr. M. B. Schaefer,
one of the authors of the NAS study, informs us that the latter interpretation is correct.)
The fisheries example affords an excellent illustration of the magnitude of the error involved. Suppose that an increase in oceanographic knowledge opens up an opportunity to exploit profitably a
previously untapped fishery population. The increase in national
product resulting from this technological shift in knowledge clearly
is not measured by the market value of the increased catch alone.
Setting aside for the moment the validity of the estimates of increased physical production of fishery products associated with increased oceanographic research, it should be evident that only a
fraction of the gross increment to market value of fish landings
could be considered a net benefit, since additional labor and capital
7. For a summary of alternative ways of calculating benefits and costs to determine
optimal scale and composition of a program, see Lee, op. cit. supra note 2, at 57-107.
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will usually be required to translate that knowledge into additional
production.
The inshore and offshore fisheries of the United States are presently subject to unrestricted entry. Since there are no legal or technical barriers to the formation of new fishing units, any increase in
productivity resulting from increased oceanographic knowledge and
its impact on production functions would lead to increased net returns to the individual vessel and then to an increase in the number
of fishing units. A new equilibrium will be restored only when average vessel earnings are again at the minimum level required to
maintain existing investment. One of the most serious problems of
the marine fisheries is the inherent tendency for all economic rent
attributable to the resource to be dissipated by excessive entry. The
existence of this inherent tendency is well documented in both theory
and empirical studies.8
Surely the problems of entry imply that the net benefits to be
attributed to increased oceanographic research are likely to be very
small-at least, no larger than the additional net return to the old
and new units engaged in the fishery. More fish would be obtained,
but only by foregoing other things that could have been produced
with the additional labor and capital attracted to the fishery. Moreover, if the increased fishing effort induced by cost-saving innovations stemming from oceanographic research leads to levels of
fishing effort at which the yield capabilities of the fish stocks concerned are exceeded, no additional output will be realized and the
"savings" will be dissipated by overcapacity in the fishery. Hence,
the NAS estimate of a discounted value of 207 million dollars for
the increase in net returns from fishing will be grossly in error even
if one accepts without question the adequacy of the assumed link
between the additional research and the additional catch.
Precisely the same criticism would apply to the calculation of
benefits from mineral production resulting from the production
possibilities opened by research in oceanography. Benefits from outdoor recreation were also calculated in gross terms. Again ignoring
the realism of the assumed relation between oceanographic research
and the increased value of outdoor recreation, the NAS use of total
expenditure figures is unacceptable in any kind of benefit-cost analysis of outdoor recreation. This has long been recognized in the
8. The literature, including a summary of the pioneering work of H. Scott Gordon
and A. D. Scott, is summarized in Crutchfield, The Marine Fisheries: A Problem in
International Cooperation, Am. Econ. Rev. 207 (1964).

JULY 1967]

BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS

literature, and accordingly a number of difficult but potentially useful and analytically correct techniques have been developed to
measure, at least in ordinal terms, the money value of increments to
outdoor recreation.9 It should also be noted that the recreation
benefit in the NAS report is apparently calculated on the basis of
existing expenditures, not on the increment to expenditures expected
to result from additional oceanographic effort. If this correction is
made, the spectacular benefit-cost ratio realized in this sector diminishes drastically-from eight-to-one to four-tenths-to-one.
The opportunity cost concept, that is, the value of output foregone by use of associated factors of production, is involved in a
somewhat different type of error in the calculation of benefits to
shipborne foreign trade. For example, rerouting to reduce weather
losses is likely to involve additional storage costs, delays in port,
and, in some cases, increased fuel costs. Similarly, reduction of turnaround time may require changes in operating costs as a result of
altered maintenance and fuel requirements. It seems highly unlikely
that all of the savings listed are purely additive. Moreover, ocean
shipping, like other capital-intensive industries, has experienced
marked technological advances in a variety of fields, some of which
offer alternatives to improved oceanographic knowledge of the type
cited. For example, increased use of radar and improved navigation
techniques may well be alternatives, and conceivably less expensive,
to some of the benefits ascribed to improved oceanographic research.
These are matters of conjecture; however, it is vitally important to
recognize that the widest possible range of alternatives must be considered in calculating benefits. To the extent that the non-oceanographic or non-water-alternatives are available, their costs set limits
to the benefits to be ascribed to oceanographic research per se.
In connection with the assumed benefits from weather forecasting, the opportunity cost concept again was ignored by NAS. Even
if it is assumed that weather forecasting can be improved to a
degree that permits substantial savings of the sort indicated, the
benefits do not come free. Some adaptation of current productive
methods would be required to make use of the improved forecast,
and any change in technology requires that costs be incurred to alter
production techniques in the appropriate manner. Obviously, some
9. See, e.g., U.S. Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, Economic
Studies of Outdoor Recreation (Report No. 24, 1962) ; Clawson & Knetsch, Outdoor
Recreation Research-Some Concepts and Suggested Areas of Research, 3 Natural
Resources J. 250 (1963).
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savings would be realized or the change in technology would be
economically meaningless, but it is seldom free of associated incremental cost.
In these cases, as in the fishery estimates, there is no conceptual
error if the authors intended to include all associated factor costs in
the percentage adjustments in column 7 of Table 1. If this is the
correct interpretation, however the percentages attributed to oceanographic research-i 0 to 100 %-appear absurdly high.
B. Effects on Market Prices
Another conceptual difficulty of the NAS study involves the impact of additional output on market prices. For some of the benefits
estimated, price effects could probably be ignored with impunity. In
others, however, it is difficult to see how one could justify the use of
current prices for either gross or net benefit estimates where major
changes in output relative to existing levels are anticipated. Thus,
an increase in fish landings of the magnitude contemplated could not
be absorbed at present price levels over the period indicated, unless
it is assumed that all of the increased landings displace imports, or
that the demand for major groups of fishery products is almost
perfectly elastic. Neither assumption seems reasonable. The same
criticism applies to some of the calculations of agricultural benefits
attributed to more accurate long-range weather forecasting.
C. Scale and Composition of the Research Program
A final conceptual weakness of the NAS study is the failure to
consider the appropriate scale and composition of investment in the
analysis. If there is no budget constraint, proper application of
benefit-cost analysis would require that each separable element of
the oceanographic program show potential benefits in excess of
costs, and that the level of expenditure in each area be such that
marginal net benefits are zero. Even if a budget constraint is operative, the aggregate expenditure on oceanography obviously should
be reallocated, since a dollar of additional effort in an area showing
a benefit cost ratio of six-to-one would, on any reasonable assumptions, yield a larger addition to net benefits than the amount foregone by cutting back in a field where the ratio is near unity. The
benefit-cost ratios shown for the various elements of the oceanographic program suggest only that the scale of the research effort
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should be expanded. There is an equally important need to reallocate effort within the program to achieve the largest total net
benefit.
III

QUESTIONS OF FACTS AND FIGURES
The NAS study authors are to be commended for developing the
estimates of benefits from inevitably scanty data. The study authors
claim more than they are able to offer in factual support. The statement, "These estimates are based only on tangible and foreseeable
economic results of federally supported oceanographic research,"' 0
makes it legitimate to assume that the authors place some confidence
in the quantitative estimates provided. Attention has been focused
on four areas in which oceanographic research is expected to yield
substantial benefits: (1) commercial fisheries; (2) long-range
weather forecasting; (3) near-shore sewage disposal; and (4)
near-shore recreation.
A. CommercialFisheries
With respect to commercial fisheries, the issue is simply one of
different interpretation of existing facts. The authors of the study
seem confident that the United States Government will share in an
expanding international fishery to a degree that will provide a major increase in income to American fishermen. The record of the
post-war years, with a few notable exceptions, appears to point in
the other direction. In general, the American fishing industry has
not kept pace with the revolutionary technological changes in fishing vessels and gear that have characterized the post-war years.
This reflects in some areas the effects of restrictive union practices
(in particular, opposition to having the same men perform fishing
and seamen's duties), but in part it simply indicates a comparative
advantage to nationals of other major fishing countries. In short,
operating costs for American high seas fishing ventures are likely
to be substantially higher than those of other nations, and, barring
major federal subsidies, it is difficult to see anything in the future
that will alter this situation on a broad scale. But of course, even if
subsidies are granted, proper benefit-cost calculation would reflect the
higher factor cost involved. Thus, it is at least questionable whether
10. National Academy of Sciences,

op. cit. supra note 5.
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America's share in the high seas fisheries will expand or even be
maintained except in the few fields such as tuna, where American
technology is clearly advanced enough to make the industry competitive on a cost basis.
The general levels of prices and wages in several major competitors-Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom, for examplehave risen more rapidly than in the United States, and higher factor
prices, together with the cost effects of depletion on more and more
international fishing grounds, may open up new opportunities for
the American fleets. For example, it is possible that increasing demand and rising costs might raise prices of frozen fish blocks and
fish meal-both are major items in internationally traded fish products-to where American fishermen could participate more actively
with only moderate improvements in technology. Nevertheless, it
is difficult to envisage a major shift in favor of American high seas
fisheries at the present time.
As far as improvement in the American competitive position in
the domestic market is concerned, nothing in the NAS study is
offered beyond the statement: "If our fishermen, through research
and engineering, can recapture the share of the market lost to imports during the past decade and a half by cutting their production
costs, an annual market for nearly 800,000 tons of edible fish and a
similar amount of industrial fish would be provided."" The "if" is
a very large one. It should be stressed that this opportunity has
existed throughout the post-war period, yet it has not been possible
for American producers to cut costs and/or develop additional
sources of supply that would make them competitive with imports,
particularly in the edible fish field.
Moreover, it is by no means clear that technological improvements, arising out of oceanographic research or in better capital
equipment, alone would improve the cost position of American producers. Many technological advances and improvements in oceanographic knowledge are likely to be available to all, and the relative
position of foreign and American producers may well remain unchanged or even shift further in favor of the former. It is possible
that the relative position of American fishermen could be improved
even by freely available improvements under some circumstances.
Since labor costs tend to be much higher relative to total fishing
costs in American operations than in other major fishing operations,
11.

Id. at 15.
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labor-saving developments would favor domestic producers. Also,
some types of technological improvements may be specific to particular species found only in areas close to American ports or may
be usable only under certain oceanographic conditions characteristic
of local waters. In such cases American producers could enjoy an
improvement in costs relative to otherwise equally proficient foreign
operators. On a priori grounds both conditions might be expected
to be of some practical importance in individual fisheries. But, in
more general terms, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that technological improvements, however desirable on other grounds, will not
enable the American fishing industry to make up much ground within ten or fifteen years.
It would appear that the estimate of fifty per cent increase in
foreign and domestic fisheries of the United States attributable to
oceanographic research may be high. One can only point out that
immediate past experience would suggest a more moderate figure,
even if the oceanographic effort is increased substantially. In recent
decades the major oceanographic effort has been oriented not toward fishery development, but toward heavily exploited stocks,
many of which were already in difficulty because of excessive fishing
effort. These programs have been most useful in adding to knowledge of the dynamics of economically significant fishery resources,
and further effort could expand knowledge of presently unused or
underutilized species. But the great barrier to increased economic
output from these stocks is not inadequate scientific knowledge, but
inability to compete economically with foreign fish producers and
domestic suppliers of other protein foods. Even if this is too pessimistic about the long-run cost position of American fishermen, it
would appear most unlikely that oceanographic research would be
the best (or even a very useful) way to bring about the necessary
increases in productivity. 2
B. Long-Range WeatherForecasting
The benefits that could be derived from improved long-range
weather forecasting also seem very optimistic. The NAS report
suggests that savings of 2 billion dollars a year might result from
improvements made possible by an expanded oceanographic research program. Studies undertaken by the Rand Corporation and
12. We are indebted to D. L. Alverson, of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries for
raising this issue. This does not imply, however, endorsement by Mr. Alverson of the
Bureau of the view expressed in this Article.
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others suggest that savings would be much smaller than those estimated by NAS.'8
The benefits to be derived from improved weather forecasting
may involve substantial additional costs if the production techniques
affected are to be modified to take full advantage of the increased
forecasting accuracy. One of the important incremental costs associated with the adaptation to improved weather forecasting would
be the additional research required simply to learn how to adapt to
it. In part this would be a matter of additional applied research and
technology in the industries, particularly agriculture, for which
potential savings would exist. In the case of agriculture, and to
some extent in others, there would also be a substantial additional
burden in the form of extension and educational work required to
insure adoption of the more profitable techniques. In an industry
characterized by hundreds of thousands of relatively small units, it
is hardly realistic to assume that benefits as indirect as those associated with new concepts of weather forecasting and their application would be disseminated fully within one generation.
The authors of the report suggest that improved weather forecasting might reduce the nation's annual bill for flood losses by
twenty-five to fifty per cent, or 70 to 140 million dollars a year.
Claiming this as a benefit presupposes two questionable assumptions. First, that people would be able to make the necessary adjustments in their activities to take advantage of the improved
forecasts, and second, that there are no cheaper ways of achieving
this reduction in flood losses. Neither assumption appears to have
firm support in the NAS report or in recent studies relating to flood
problems. Other evidence suggests upper limits of ten to twenty
per cent in the reduction of flood losses through the best possible
weather forecasting.' 4 Improved forecasting is required, in the
main, for small drainage areas-an intractable problem from the
viewpoint of long range weather forecasts.
C. Near-Shore Sewage Disposal
The treatment of savings from near-shore sewage disposal aris13. See, e.g., Rand Corporation, Utility of Weather Forecasts to the Raisin Industry (1961); Demsetz, Economic Gains from Storm Warnings: Two Florida Case
Studies (1962) ; Rand Corporation & U.S. Weather Bureau, The National Research
Effort on Improved Weather Description and Prediction for Social and Economic
Purposes (1964).
14. Kates, Industrial Flood Losses: Damage Estimation in the Lehigh Valley (Dep't
of Geography, Univ. of Chicago, Research Paper No. 98, 1965).
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ing out of improved oceanographic knowledge appears faulty. First,
the maximum savings that can be attributed to such knowledge are
limited by the availability of alternative treatment methods. In
addition, waste disposal problems are, to a considerable extent,
specific to each area. Moreover, the use of water for disposal is part
of a much larger and more complex system of water supply and
utilization. An optimal solution to waste disposal problems cannot
be specified except in relation to the overall sources and costs of
water supply and of alternative methods of handling waste disposal,
some of which need not involve water use at all.' 5
The possibility of realizing twenty-five per cent savings in construction costs and operating costs is questionable except in conjunction with improved systems analysis of the overall problem of
waste disposal within the larger setting of water supply and water
quality. If the latter view of the problem is adopted, however, it
is no longer possible to attribute one hundred per cent of the savings
to oceanographic research alone. Rather, the savings would reflect
the overall impact of proper placement of the waste disposal problem in terms of policy determination and administration.
In a more pragmatic vein, there is no evidence that public policy
generally is tending toward the admittedly desirable approach of
estimating the assimilative capacity of receiving waters in setting
waste disposal standards. On the contrary, there seems to be a general drift in the direction of fixed standards of waste removal, at
least within states and regions.
D. Near-Shore Recreation
It is difficult to value outdoor recreation, shore-based or other,
and the various alternative approaches to the establishment of
priorities for research and investment in this increasingly important
field of government activity."' One can be sympathetic to any author
faced with the need to quantify incremental recreation benefits,
particularly when coupled with the need to cement the tenuous links
between research and results. For those very reasons, however, the
magnitude of the benefits projected in the NAS study is highly questionable: ( 1 ) it introduces a heavy bias in the final conclusions; (2)
it is analytically incorrect; (3) it contains a gross computational
error; and, (4) the ten per cent of the annual increase in gross
15. See Kneese, The Economics of Regional Water Quality Management (1964).
16. See Clawson & Knetsch, op. cit. supra note 9. For analyses of some noneconomic bases for evaluation, see Kates, Comprehensive Resource Plan, 1974: Strategy
for Regional Growth (1966).
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expenditures on near-shore recreation attributed to oceanographic
research is clearly plucked from thin air.
Analytically, the major error lies in the use of gross expenditures
as a measure of net benefits. The computational error involves the
use of current total rather than incremental additions to expenditure. As for the choice of ten per cent of whatever benefit one derives as the proportion to be attributed to additional oceanographic
research, no supporting evidence is presented. One can only wonder
why the rate of growth in near-shore recreation achieved before the
expanded oceanographic program got under way should be extrapolated thereafter and designated, even in part, as a result of the additional research effort. Finally, it would appear that some of the
benefits gleaned from improved recreation, (better sewage disposal,
for example), have already been counted as savings in sewage disposal-which presupposes that receiving water standards for recreational use have been met.
E. Future Costs of Present Research Effort
Scientists capable of independent direction of productive research
are also the bulwark of the training programs upon which rests the
future supply of scientific personnel at all levels. The elasticity of
supply of this group is relatively low, particularly in the short run.
Consequently, any major effort to increase basic research activity in
a particular field involves some "tradeoff" of increased output in
the short-run for a decrease in the flow of scientists and scientific
achievement over the longer-run. The situation is illustrated very
clearly in the case of oceanography. To the extent that the national
oceanographic program is able to sustain the rate of increase of
scientific activity planned for the next twenty years, it is likely to
place severe restrictions, at least for some period of time, on the
ability of its best personnel to participate in the training of doctoral
candidates and (probably more important) the recruitment of
scientists from other disciplines to meet the needs of the oceanographic field. If expansion of the oceanographic research effort does
reduce, even temporarily, the quantity and quality of trained oceanographers forthcoming in future years, the NAS estimates of benefits may be generally overstated.
CONCLUSION

The basic problems of establishing the appropriate level of oceanographic research and its proper allocation among constituent ele-
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ments of the program will not be resolved by benefit-cost analysis
as undertaken in the NAS study. This area remains one of many in
which the economic evaluation of the end products of research and
development expenditures cannot yet be done with precision comparable to that achieved in other types of water development.
Nevertheless, much can be accomplished by a stronger and analytically sound application of benefit-cost principles to research and
development activities in oceanography. The very process of forcing the agencies concerned to isolate and examine the outputs and
associated costs resulting from their activities may well lead to an
internal reordering of programs in the direction of greater efficiency. There is, after all, more than a trivial number of cases in which
benefits from competing programs are roughly equal, and where
sensible choices can be made on the basis of costs alone. Similarly,
if one program generates larger benefits than others, a basis for
rational choice exists if costs of the superior project are as low or
lower than those of competing alternatives even though benefits
cannot be measured precisely. And the cases where benefits and
specific costs associated with them can be measured are numerous
and increasing. Some improvement can be realized immediately,
but only if the benefit-cost is applied correctly and consistently.
These gains are not without associated dangers. Most of the research in oceanography is done by or financed by federal government agencies. The Bureau of the Budget insistence on a benefit-cost
approach to programming may warp agency planning in the direction of mission-oriented as opposed to basic research, and toward
applied programs that promise measurable results and away from
those where uncertainty, risk, and the identification problem make
the measurement of benefits more speculative. Both types of development may lead away from an optimal long-range program.
The major output from research in oceanography may, for some
time, continue to be basic scientific knowledge-we are still far from
the engineering or development stage in most areas where potential
economic benefits are most promising. By all means, let us use
economic evaluation, wherever possible, to facilitate orderly choice
among specific optional projects and as a basis for establishing the
proper scale of projects with identifiable economic outputs. We
must avoid the real potential danger that easy quantification of results is the primary test of productive government research.

